DigiNotar Breach Notes

By | November 22, 2011
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Some folk have asked me for more details about the DigiNotar breach after my brief appearance on Al Jazeera this morning. So here are the notes I prepared for the segment. Links at the bottom.

Background

web security certificates are digital IDs issued by companies entrusted with making sure they are given to the right company or organisation. It allows a user to set up a secure connection between their computer and the organisation’s website. Browsers will show a little lock or some other icon to signify the certificate has been found and is trusted.

Hackers broke into a Dutch company called DigiNotar, itself owned by US firm Vasco Data Security, in mid June. DigiNotar is one of hundreds of companies around the globe called certificate authorities that issue these authentication certificates. Browsers contain a list of which CAs they can trust.

These hackers would have been able to steal existing certificates or generate their own, meaning they could now, with the help of an Internet Service Provider, launch what are called Man in the Middle Attacks–meaning they could intercept traffic, a bit like tapping a telephone.

DigiNotar noticed that something was amiss in July, but didn’t realise the extent of the breach until late August, by which time more than 500 (531) fake certificates were issued. While some cover domains like the CIA and MI6, these are probably just distractions. The key ones are a dozen issued for domains like Google, Facebook and Skype.

Why do we think this was about Iran?

Studies of the validation requests–browsers pinging DigiNotar to confirm the certificate’s authenticity–showed that during August the bulk–maybe 99%–of the traffic was coming from Iran. When the certificates were eventually revoked, Iranian activity dropped.

Moreover the attackers left some quite obvious clues. They left calling cards: transcribed Farsi which translates into slogans such as  ”I will sacrifice my life for my leader.” “unknown soldier”

Why might Iran be interested?

Well, we now know that a lot of countries like Syria intercept ordinary Internet traffic through something called Deep Packet Inspection. This means that the government is basically snooping on web traffic. But when that traffic passes through these secure connections, it’s much harder. So the holy grail of any internet surveillance is to get a hold  of those certificates, or work around them. This is a brazen attempt to do this.

All Internet traffic in Iran has to go through a government proxy, making this kind of attack much simpler. The government ISP just uses the certificate to pretend to be Google, or whatever, and then passes the traffic on.

Is it the government?

This is harder to confirm. The Dutch government is investigating this. A similar attack took place against an Italian CA in March, and it shows similar fingerprints.

But the fact that the certificates were stolen and then used seems to suggest some official connection.

What could they have discovered?

Quite a lot. All the traffic that was intercepted could be deciphered.. meaning all browsing and emails. But it also may have captured cookies, meaning passwords, which would have made it easy to hack into target accounts and sniff around old emails, dig out other passwords, or hack into associated accounts, such as Google Docs.

Moreover, some of the certificates compromise something called The Onion Router, a service which anonymizes web traffic. Though TOR itself wasn’t compromised the certificates could convince your browser you were talking to TOR, whereas in fact you’d be talking to the attacker.

Should other people be worried?

Yes, Some browser developers have been more forthcoming than others; Google Chrome and Firefox have been quick to respond. Others less so. If you’re in Iran or think you may be targetted, it’s a good idea to change your password, and to check that no one has altered your forwarding details in your email account. You should also upgrade your browser to the latest version, whatever browser you use.

DigiNotar made some horrible mistakes: one Windows domain for all certificate servers, no antivirus, a simple administrator password. There were defaced pages on the website dating back to 2009. One has to wonder what other certificate authorities are similarly compromised. We rely on these companies to know what they’re doing. They’re the top of the food chain, in the words of one analyst.

We should now be looking closely at the previous breaches and looking for others. This is a ratcheting up of the stakes in a cyberwar; this kind of thing has real world impact on those people who thought they were communicating safely and will now fear the knock on their door.

In the future this is likely to lead to a change in the way certificates are issued and checked. I don’t think DigiNotar is going to survive this, but I think a bigger issue is bound to be how this security issue is handled. I think governments which look to the Internet as a tool for democratic change need also to be aware of just how dangerous it is to encourage dissidents to communicate online, whether or not they’re being careful.

News:

BBC News – Fake DigiNotar web certificate risk to Iranians

DigiNotar – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Fake DigiNotar certificates targeting Iranians?

Expert reports/analysis:

DigiNotar Hacked by Black.Spook and Iranian Hackers – F-Secure Weblog : News from the Lab

Operation Black Tulip: Fox-IT’s report on the DigiNotar breach | Naked Security (Sophos)

Fox-IT report, operation Black Tulip (PDF)

VASCO:

Acquisition DigiNotar

VASCO DigiNotar Statement

Comodogate:

Comodo Group – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaackground

web security certificates are digital IDs issued by companies entrusted with making sure they are given to the right company or organisation. It allows a user to set up a secure connection between their computer and the organisation’s website. Browsers will show a little lock or some other icon to signify the certificate has been found and is trusted.

 

Hackers broke into a Dutch company called DigiNotar, itself owned by US firm Vasco Data Security, in mid June. DigiNotar is one of hundreds of companies around the globe called certificate authorities that issue these authentication certificates. Browsers contain a list of which CAs they can trust.

 

These hackers would have been able to steal existing certificates or generate their own, meaning they could now, with the help of an Internet Service Provider, launch what are called Man in the Middle Attacks–meaning they could intercept traffic, a bit like tapping a telephone.

 

DigiNotar noticed that something was amiss in July, but didn’t realise the extent of the breach until late August, by which time more than 500 (531) fake certificates were issued. While some cover domains like the CIA and MI6, these are probably just distractions. The key ones are a dozen issued for domains like Google, Facebook and Skype.

 

Why do we think this was about Iran?

 

Studies of the validation requests–browsers pinging DigiNotar to confirm the certificate’s authenticity–showed that during August the bulk–maybe 99%–of the traffic was coming from Iran. When the certificates were eventually revoked, Iranian activity dropped.

 

Moreover the attackers left some quite obvious clues. They left calling cards: transcribed Farsi which translates into slogans such as  “I will sacrifice my life for my leader.” “unknown soldier”

 

Why might Iran be interested?

Well, we now know that a lot of countries like Syria intercept ordinary Internet traffic through something called Deep Packet Inspection. This means that the government is basically snooping on web traffic. But when that traffic passes through these secure connections, it’s much harder. So the holy grail of any internet surveillance is to get a hold  of those certificates, or work around them. This is a brazen attempt to do this.

 

All Internet traffic in Iran has to go through a government proxy, making this kind of attack much simpler. The government ISP just uses the certificate to pretend to be Google, or whatever, and then passes the traffic on.

 

Is it the government?

This is harder to confirm. The Dutch government is investigating this. A similar attack took place against an Italian CA in March, and it shows similar fingerprints.

 

What could they have discovered?

Quite a lot. All the traffic that was intercepted could be deciphered.. meaning all browsing and emails. But it also may have captured cookies, meaning passwords, which would have made it easy to hack into target accounts and sniff around old emails, dig out other passwords, or hack into associated accounts, such as Google Docs.

 

Moreover, some of the certificates compromise something called The Onion Router, a service which anonymizes web traffic. Though TOR itself wasn’t compromised the certificates could convince your browser you were talking to TOR, whereas in fact you’d be talking to the attacker.

 

Should other people be worried?

Yes, Some browser developers have been more forthcoming than others; Google Chrome and Firefox have been quick to respond. Others less so. If you’re in Iran or think you may be targetted, it’s a good idea to change your password, and to check that no one has altered your forwarding details in your email account. You should also upgrade your browser to the latest version, whatever browser you use.

 

DigiNotar made some horrible mistakes: one Windows domain for all certificate servers, no antivirus, a simple administrator password. There were defaced pages on the website dating back to 2009. One has to wonder what other certificate authorities are similarly compromised. We rely on these companies to know what they’re doing. They’re the top of the food chain, in the words of one analyst.

 

We should now be looking closely at the previous breaches and looking for others. This is a ratcheting up of the stakes in a cyberwar; this kind of thing has real world impact on those people who thought they were communicating safely and will now fear the knock on their door.

 

In the future this is likely to lead to a change in the way certificates are issued and checked. I don’t think DigiNotar is going to survive this, but I think a bigger issue is bound to be how this security issue is handled. I think governments which look to the Internet as a tool for democratic change need also to be aware of just how dangerous it is to encourage dissidents to communicate online, whether or not they’re being careful.

Real Phone Hacking

By | November 22, 2011
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Interesting glimpse into the real world of phone hacking–not the amateurish stuff we’ve been absored by in the UK–by Sharmine Narwani: In Lebanon, The Plot Thickens « Mideast Shuffle.

First off, there’s the indictment just released by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon which, in the words of Narwani,

appears to be built on a simple premise: the “co-location” of cellular phones — traceable to the accused four — that coincide heavily with Hariri’s whereabouts and crucial parts of the murder plot in the six weeks prior to his death.

Indeed, the case relies heavily on Call Data Record (CDR) analysis. Which sounds kind of sophisticated. Or is it? Narwani contends that this could have been manufactured. Indeed, she says,

there isn’t a literate soul in Lebanon who does not know that the country’s telecommunications networks are highly infiltrated — whether by competing domestic political operatives or by foreign entities.

There is plenty of evidence to support this. The ITU recently issued two resolutions [PDF] basically calling on Israel to stop conducting “piracy, interference and disruption, and sedition”.

And Lebanon has arrested at least two men accused of helping Israel infiltrate the country’s cellular networks. What’s interesting about this from a data war point of view is that one of those arrested has confessed, according to Narwani, to lobbying for the cellular operator he worked for not to install more secure hardware, made by Huawei, which would have presumably made eavesdropping harder. (A Chinese company the good guy? Go figure.)

If this were the case–if Lebanon’s cellular networks were so deeply penetrated–then it’s evidence of the kind of cyberwar we’re not really equipped to understand, let alone deal with: namely data manipulation.

Narwani asks whether it could be possible that the tribunal has actually been hoodwinked by a clever setup: that all the cellular data was faked, when

a conspiring “entity” had to obtain the deepest access into Lebanese telecommunications networks at one or — more likely — several points along the data logging trail of a mobile phone call. They would have to be able to intercept data and alter or forge it, and then, importantly, remove all traces of the intervention.

After all, she says,

the fact is that Hezbollah is an early adherent to the concept of cyberwarfare. The resistance group have built their own nationwide fiber optics network to block enemy eavesdropping, and have demonstrated their own ability to intercept covert Israeli data communications. To imagine that they then used traceable mobile phones to execute the murder of the century is a real stretch.

Who knows? But Darwani asserts that

Nobody doubts Israel’s capacity to carry out this telecom sleight of hand — technology warfare is an entrenched part of the nation’s military strategies. This task would lie somewhere between the relatively facile telephone hacking of the News of the World reporters and the infinitely more complex Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, in which Israel is a prime suspect.

In other words, there’s something going on here that is probably a lot more sophisticated than a tribunal can get behind. I’m no Mideast expert, but if only half of this is true it’s clear that cellphones are the weakest link in a communications chain. And that if this kind of thing is going on Lebanon, one has to assume that it’s going on in a lot of places.

Korean Banks

By | November 22, 2011
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The Washington Post report that it seems the attack on South Korea’s Nonghyup agricultural bank back in April was the work of North Korea. The evidence?

South Korean investigators said they determined that 10 servers used in the bank incident were the same ones used in previous cyberattack operations against South Korea, including one in 2009 and another in March, that they blamed on the North. Investigators say they determined, for instance, that a “command and control” server used in the 2009 operation was registered to a North Korean government agency operating in China.

This is interesting. Command and control servers are compromised computers that are used by bad guys to “run” other computers—zombies—that actually do the grunt work. There’s definitely a common thread between the 2009 and 2011 DDOS attacks, and plenty of circumstan

Southeast Asia’s Third Mobile Tier

By | November 22, 2011
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The mobile revolution is moving from second tier countries in Southeast Asia to the third and final tier. Whereas previously Indonesia and the Philippines were seeing the biggest growth in mobile Internet traffic, now it’s Burma (Myanmar) and Cambodia which top the list in terms of user- and usage-growth, according to the Opera State of the Mobile Web report for July:

    • Myanmar and Cambodia lead the top 10 countries of the region in terms of page-view growth (6415.0 % and 470.1 %, respectively).
    • Myanmar and Cambodia lead the top 10 countries of the region in growth of unique users (1207.5 % and 179.1 %, respectively).
    • Myanmar and Cambodia lead the top 10 countries of the region in growth of data transferred (3826.6 % and 353.2 %, respectively)

Of course these figures are from a low base, and the Opera data is not the easiest to trawl through. (The Opera mobile report is always interesting reading, so long as you take into account that the Opera browser is for many people a Symbian browser and so of declining popularity in some quarters. Also their data is never presented in quite the order one would like, so you have to dig. )

Looking at the figures in more detail, and throwing them into a spreadsheet of my own, it’s clear that Burma is definitely an outlier. Cambodia’s growth is impressive, but Burma’s is by far the greatest out of all 27 countries surveyed. Here’s how it looks:

2011-07 Page view growth SEA

So is the Burma usage real, or is this just a jump from nothing to slightly more than nothing? I suspect it may actually be a sizeable jump. Opera are coy about the actual number of users (so we may actually be dealing with a small dataset). But the figures suggest that this is a real spurt in usage: Burmese mobile users are transferring more data per page view than any other of the 27 countries surveyed, and the page views per user is on a par with the Philippines and Thailand.

I’d cautiously suggest that Burma, along with Cambodia and Laos, are beginning to show exhibit some of the signs of what one might pompously call “mobile societies”: using the mobile phone as an Internet device as a regular part of their activities. Take the page views per user, for example, which measures how much they’re using the mobile phone to view the Internet (Brunei seems to be in a league of its own; I don’t know what’s going on there, except that in terms of nightlife, I’d have to say not much):

2010-07 Page views per user SEA

It’s probably too much to conclude that mobile phones as Internet devices are now mainstream in this third tier of the region, but it’s a healthy sign, with lots of interesting implications.