Tag Archives: Blue Frog

From the Ashes of Blue Frog

The Blue Frog may be no more,  but the vigilantes are. Seems that despite the death of Blue Security in the face of a spammer’s wrath, the service has built an appetite for fighting back. Eric B. Parizo of SearchSecurity.com reports on a new independent group called Okopipi who intend “to pick up where Blue Security left off by creating an open source, peer-to-peer software program that automatically sends “unsubscribe” messages to spammers and/or reports them to the proper authorities.”

Okopipi has already merged with a similar effort known as Black Frog and has recruited about 160 independent programmers, who are dissecting the open source code from Blue Security’s Blue Frog product. The idea seems to be the same: automatically sending opt-out requests to Web sites referenced in received spam messages, the idea is to over-burden the spammer’s servers (or those of the product he’s advertising) as a deterrence and incentive to register with Okopipi. By registering he can cleanse his spam list of Okopipi members.

Some tweaks seem to be under consideration: Processing will take place on users’ machines and then on a set of servers which will be hidden to try to prevent the kind of denial-of-service attack that brought down Blue Frog.

Possible problems: I noticed that some of the half million (quite a feat, when you think about it) Blue Frog users were quite, shall we say, passionate about the endeavour. These are the kind of folk now switching to Okopipi. This, then, could become an all-out war in which a lot of innocent bystanders get burned. The Internet is a holistic thing; if Denial of Service attacks proliferate, it may affect the speed and accessibility of a lot of other parts of it, as the Blue Frog experience revealed. (TypePad was inaccessible for several hours.)

Another worry: Richi Jennings, an analyst with San Francisco-based Ferris Research, points out on Eric’s piece that project organizers must ensure that spammers don’t infiltrate the effort and plant backdoor programs within the software. “If I’m going to download the Black Frog application,” Jennings said, “I want to be sure that the spammers aren’t inserting code into it to use my machine as a zombie.” I guess this would happen if spammers signed up for the service and then fiddled with the P2P distributed Black Frog program.

Another problem, pointed out by Martin McKeay, a security professional based in Santa Rosa, Calif., that spammers will quickly figure out that the weak link in all this is it rests on the idea of a legitimate link in the email for unsubscribing, and that spammers will just include a false link in there. Actually I thought the link Blue Frog used wasn’t unsubscribe (which is usually fake, since if it wasn’t would then pull the spammer back within the law) but the purchase link. How, otherwise, would folks be able to buy their Viagra?

One element I’d like to understand better is the other weakness in the Blue Frog system: That however the process is encrypted, spammers can easily see who are members of the antispam group by comparing their email lists before and after running it through the Blue Frog/Black Frog list. Any member who is on the spammer’s list will now be vulnerable to the kind of mass email attack that Blue Frog’s destroyer launched. How is Okopipi going to solve that one?

The Red-faced Blue Frog

What’s intriguing about this Blue Security/Blue Frog episode, where angry spammers attack the anti-spam company with a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, which in turn directs traffic (unwittingly or wittingly, it’s not clear yet) and temporarily brings down blog hoster TypePad, is this: The guy behind Blue Security, Eran Reshef, is founder of Skybox, a company “focused on enabling the continuous enterprise-wide assessment of vulnerabilities and threats affecting corporate networks.”

This is at best somewhat embarrassing for Reshef, and for Blue Security, at worst it exposes him and the company to ridicule and lawsuits. Getting involved in battling spammers is not a task taken on lightly, and the one thing that Blue Security had going for it was that it seemed to know what it was doing. Users download software and register their email addresses in a central database. Spammers are encouraged to remove those email addresses; if they don’t, the software will respond to subsequent spam by visiting the website advertised and automatically filling the order form. If enough people have the software running this, in theory, creates an overwhelming amount of traffic for the spammer and brings their business to a halt. Blue Security now says it has tens of thousands of members.

But then came last week’s attack. Reshef initially said that that no such DDoS took place on the www.bluesecurity.com server, something contested by some analysts. He has since said that a DDoS did take place, but against operational, back-end servers  and not connected to his company’s front door. This, he said, he only spotted later. He says that when he redirected traffic to his blog at TypePad there was no DDoS on the bluesecurity.com website; that, he says, came later. This appears to be borne out by web logs provided to TechWeb journalist Gregg Keizer.

Blue Security’s handling of this raises more questions than it answers. Many are highly technical and not ones I understand. But there are some basic ones. Was the company not prepared for spammers to retaliate? Did it not have any procedures in place? Why did it redirect traffic to TypePad without informing them first? Why did it not coordinate closely with its ISP? And why, given Reshef’s expertise on DDoS attacks with Skybox, was he not able to spot the DDoS attack on his backend servers?

The Blue Frog vs PharmaMaster

I’ve been trying to make some sense of this recent drama involving Blue Security, an anti-spam registry that effectively tries to deter uncooperative spammers by overwhelming their servers, and recent outages at TypePad and LiveJournal apparently caused by a revenge attack by spammers on Blue Security. (Here’s some more information on Blue Security and the Blue Frog.) The outages were caused when Blue Security redirected the spammers’ attacks on its website to the company’s blogs which were hosted on TypePad and LiveJournal.

So what really happened?

  • Blue Security’s web site has been under attack for most of this past week, via a distributed denial-of-service (DoS) attack which basically tries to overwhelm a site with traffic sent from as many computers as possible (the site is now back up);
  • To try to deflect the attack, which effectively suspended its service, Blue Security changed its Internet address to its TypePad blog;
  • This overwhelmed SixApart’s servers, temporarily affecting all its blogging services, including TypePad and LiveJournal;
  • Meanwhile, spammers presumably linked to the DDoS attack sent threatening emails to, apparently, anyone on the list of the Blue Security do-not-intrude registry. Blue Security works by building a network of users who report spam. The source of the spam is then contacted and then asked to remove all email addresses of its members from their spam lists. If they fail to do so, software installed on users’ computers fills out forms on websites linked to in any subsequent spam, creating a wave of traffic to the spammer’s web site, that, in theory, brings the spammer’s activities to a stop.
  • The spammer, or another spammer, then contacted Blue Security via ICQ instant message, to taunt and threaten the company, apparently in a bid to stop its activities.
  • The spammer, or another spammer, has also been sending emails containing Blue Security contact and registration information. This might have been done in the hope of getting recipients to complain to those email addresses and phone numbers to further overwhelm the company’s resources.

This account is not uncontested. According to a Blue Security press release:

  • Blue Security claims that it was not the victim of a DDoS attack, but that the spammer — identified as PharmaMaster –– persuaded a staff member of a top-tier Internet Service Provider to block Blue Security’s IP address at the backbone. This would have blocked all traffic from outside Israel, where the Blue Security web site is located.
  • Blue Security then closed its web site and posted a note on its blog (hosted elsewhere.)
  • Shortly afterwards, Blue Security says, PharmaMaster launched a DDoS attack on any site associated with Blue Security, causing outages at five top hosting providers, a major DNS provider and a popular blog site.
  • Blue Security has denied reports, including one by the Associated Press, saying that its do-no-intrude lists have been compromised. Blue Security works by allowing compliant spammers to run its email list through a program which compares it with a special encrypted list of Blue Security members. While the spammer is not able to see or access the Blue Security list, Blue Security members’ email addresses will be removed from the spammer’s list. This is done, in part, so individual Blue Security members are not then known to a spammer, and so the spammer cannot gain access to the Blue Security registry for spamming purposes. The AP report suggests the spammer has figured out a way to work out which email addresses belong to Blue Security members by merely comparing its own list before and after running it through the Blue Security removal process. Those email addresses no longer on the spammer’s list must be Blue Security members, the report says.

This account is contested by some security analysts, who point out what they say are some inconsistencies in Blue Security’s account:

  • Elsewhere Blue Security’s Eran Reshef acknowledges that Blue Security didn’t just post a note on its blog, but it redirected traffic from its bluesecurity.com URL to the TypePad blog. He is quoted as saying he didn’t anticipate that the spammer would launch a DDoS attack on such a large player. “I didn’t think he was so crazy as to attack them,” said Reshef. This raises the question: Was this done before or after the DDoS began? Rashef says it was.
  • If Blue Security’s routing was changed internally, as Blue Security suggests, there should be a record. One analyst says he can find no record of anything “fishy.”

Blue Security clearly has its supporters. An article on one website has received, at the time of writing, more than 200 comments. The Blue Security blog’s single post received more than 100 before comments were closed.

Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects to all this is how clearly at least one spammer perceives Blue Security as a threat to its business. Not only is it trying to scare the company and members of its registry into abandoning their approach, but it is also adopting more open tactics: contacting the target directly via ICQ, perhaps in an effort to intimidate or negotiate, and to email and post comments to the above websites to try to scare members into removing their names from the registry and uninstalling the software that returns spam to the sender’s servers.

You don’t need to agree with Blue Security’s tactics to acknowledge they must be making some kind of impact for this to happen. What is perhaps a little bit scary is that Blue Security don’t seem to have been ready for this attack, and reveal some naivety and lack of understanding about how the Internet works by merely redirecting the assault to other servers. Not only would this not solve their problem, it also exposes them to legal action by the companies behind the redirected servers if it emerges that they were not informed beforehand. Still a lot of questions to be answered on this one.

The Penguin Embraces the Frog

Blue Frog, the anti-spam ‘vigilante’ software that has courted some controversy, has introduced a Linux Version :

This new offering will enable the 29 million Linux platform users to participate in the Blue Community and register in the company’s Do Not Intrude Registry to actively fight spam and safeguard personal and business e-mail accounts though a hands-on, community-based approach.

The Linux version of Blue Frog was created directly through the contributions of Blue Community members and Linux developers and enthusiasts at large. The Blue Frog visible source program allows users and developers to contribute to the development of the Blue Frog client by providing feedback and comments to the company to enhance the Blue Frog software and assist in adapting it to other platforms. Users and developers can click to join the Blue Frog development effort.

The press release from the company, Blue Security, says that

[s]ince the launch of the Do Not Intrude Registry in the summer of 2005, approximately 65,000 e-mail addresses have been registered and protected through the Blue Community. Preliminary results of the Beta service have users reporting 50 percent or greater reduction in the amount of spam they receive, indicating that a number of spammers already comply with the Registry and avoid sending spam to Blue Security customers.

The Blue Frog Claims Some Early Success

Blue Security, the anti-spam company I wrote about somewhat skeptically for WSJ.com (subscription only, I’m afraid) a few months back, are claiming initial success in their Do Not Intrude Registry. (Simply put, users sign up for the service and Blue Security threatens a kind of mass ‘visit’ to any spammer that continues to spam any user. The ‘visit’ would slow down the spammer’s server to the point he couldn’t operate.)

A press release from Blue Security says that nearly 30,000 users have joined the service, more than a quarter of whom have reported spam dropping by at least half. Those are impressive figures:

Blue Security has collected data showing that spammers who are receiving the opt-out requests have begun to comply. Community members will see the change gradually as more spammers comply with the Registry and remove member e-mail addresses from their mailing lists.

I was skeptical about the service because I wasn’t convinced it was either ethical or legal. The threat is basically to launch a Denial of Service attack on the spammer if it doesn’t comply, a move which is too law-of-the-jungle for most tastes. (Blue Security denied that what they’re doing is illegal.)

But perhaps there’s some merit to what they’re doing? If their figures are correct maybe Blue Security are onto something. As their press release says:

The Do Not Intrude Registry is based on the concept of changing the spam economy, a process that takes time.